FOREWORD
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The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) provides an IEC61508 & IEC 61511 standard. These codes are established rules of the design, and selection of safety instrumented systems (SIS), They are the statistical reperesentation of the reliability on the particular functions when a process demand occurs. The objective of the rules is to provide a margin for SILs in service, such as; SIL 1, 2, 3, and 4. This course will center on the on the practical aspects of SIL and the methodologies used for determining SILs that are include but are not limited to; LOPA, Safety layer, FTA and also discuss an overview various steps for assignment of target SIL.

THE PARTICIPANTS
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The course will be of benefit to engineering and technical personnel employed process industries, power, oil and gas, being of direct relevance to engineers involved in the provision and operation who work closely and responsible to SIS.

OBJECTIVE:
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On Successful completion of this module the participant will be  able to:
- Learn the core concepts of fundamental SIL & application in industry
- Understand how to modify & improve the existing control system without avoid the safety and business aspects.
- Learn how implement the tools of SIL based upon the IEC and the other standard a basic to control production program
- Be able to measure the reliability of SIS outcomes

COURSE OUTLINE:
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• Introduction to Safety Instrumented Systems
• The Safety Lifecycle – IEC61508
• IEC 61511 and the other applicable standards
• Risk Management & Reliability
• Process Hazard Analysis
• Layer of Protection Analysis
• Safety Integrity Level selection
• Probability of Failure Demand
• Hardware Fault Tolerance
• Case Study

DATES & VENUE:
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• DATES: 14-15 May 2012
• TIME : 8.00 am – 4.00 pm
• VENUE: PARK-LANE HOTEL
• Jalan Casablanca Kav. 18, Jakarta 12870, Indonesia
• tel: (62-21) 828 2000, fax: (62-21) 828 2222
• Email: info@parklanejakarta.com

COURSE FEES:
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Course fee is Rp. 3.750.000,- /delegate and including; lunch,  training kit, 2 x Coffee break/day, Course certificate,
excluding accommodation and Tax.

INFORMATION & REGISTRATION:
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Handal Consulting & Training
Jl. Danau Semayang Blok B III No.104, Pejompongan, Jakarta
Website: http://www.handaltraining.com
Phone; 021 – 5708775
Fax ; 021 – 5702113
24 hours INFO; 021-70897550, 081511831936

INSTRUCTOR:
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Ir. Alfino Alwie, M.Sc
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Professional Experience; 11 (Eleven) Years experience in  Aircraft industry that includes; Investigation of design for improved civil aircraft maintainability, high temperature oxidation alloys and on job training at several Europe companies,  such as: Airbus Industry & Rolls Royce, Britania Airways.  Last 10 (Ten) years in Oil & Gas, petrochemical industries i.e.: FPSO Belanak CONOCOPHILIPS, Unocal-West Seno, SAPI-HANOVER,  TOTAL PECIKO 3-4, CNOOC especially in Safety Management System Review for certification purposes, as Independent Certification Team (ICT)-MIGAS and also active to develop Risk Based Inspection, Reliability Centered Maintenance and Risk Assessment such as: KONDUR PSA, RBUI-BP-Indonesia, CNOOC, EXXONMOBIL, BP-Sub marine Pipelines, PT PUPUK KALTIM Tbk, PT. Kaltim Pasifik Amoniak. Qualification: Master degree from Cranfield University, UK especially in the field of Safety, Reliability, Availability and Maintainability, as a member Safety & Reliability Society, UK, Certified Managing Safely by IOSH, U.K. Course attended; Advance Reliability Analysis (School of Engineering, U.K), etc.

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• TANGGAL : 13–16 March 2012
• TIME : 8.00 am – 4.00 pm
• TEMPAT :  JAKARTA / BANDUNG

Incoming search terms:

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• pabrik coating

BANDUNG-INDONESIA,  10-13  December 2012

Regristration will be closed on 31 January 2012

Don’t just train…inspire?

Successful delegates are awarded an IOSH Managing Safely Certificate

It’s not about teaching, it’s about learning
No more ‘death by PowerPoint’. We know that getting people fully involved, having fun, and learning by doing, is the way to achieve health and safety training success. We want to get delegates really thinking about what they’re learning and having the confidence and enthusiasm to put it into practice when they’re back at work.

This course is unlike any other. You’ll find a practical programme, full of step -by-step guidance, and with a sharp business focus. But you’ll also find that the highly innovative format and content engages and inspires delegates –
critical to getting essential health and safety messages across.

MANAGING SAFELY: introducing a completely new approach to health and safety training  a four-day course covering the health and safety management basics in a high impact interactive package  no jargon or off-putting legal language clear scenarios that managers can relate to superb quality animated graphics created exclusively for the course a range of ready-to-use training tools, including a board game, DVDs and quizzes a sophisticated but fun presentation  first class technical content, based on what delegates need to know in practice

WHO SHOULD GO ON MANAGING SAFELY?
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Managing safely is for managers and supervisors in any sector, and any organisation. It’s designed to get managers up to speed on the practical Managing safely won’t turn delegates into safety experts – but it will give them the knowledge and tools to tackle the health and safety issues.

CERTIFICATION:
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An IOSH ‘Managing safely’ certificate is awarded to all those who attend the course and successfully complete both the written and practical assessments.

Managing safely covers…

1. Introducing managing safely

Some managers may see health and safety as an add-on to their role – even an intrusion. The first module makes it clear that managers are accountable for their teams, and makes a persuasive case for managing safely.

2. Assessing risks

This module defines and demystifies‘risk’ and ‘risk assessment’. Risk assessments and a simple scoring system are introduced, and delegates carry out a series of assessments.

3. Controlling risks

Here the session tackles cutting risks down, concentrating on the best techniques to control key risks, and how to choose the right method.

4. Understanding your responsibilities

down environmental impacts. This module looks at the demands of the law and how the legal system works, and introduces a health and safety management system.

5. Identifying hazards

All the main issues any operation has to deal with are covered in this module – entrances and exits, work traffic, fire, chemicals, electricity, physical and verbal abuse, bullying, stress, noise, housekeeping and the working environment, slips, trips and falls, working at height, computers and manual handling.

6. Investigating accidents and incidents

The session starts with why accidents should be investigated, and goes on to cover why things go wrong, and how to carry out an investigation when they do.

7. Measuring performance

This module explains how checking performance can help to improve health and safety. Delegates learn how to develop basic performance indicators, and get to grips with auditing and proactive and reactive measuring

8. Protecting our environment

A short but effective introduction to waste and pollution leads into a look at how organizations and individual managers can get involved in cutting

Examination:

Understanding of the course material is evaluated by means of a 45-minute written assessment paper consisting of 20 multi-format questions and a practical assessment.

DATES & VENUE
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DATES : 10-13 December 2012
TIME : 8.00 am – 5.00 pm
VENUE : Bandung

COURSE FEES
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Course fee is US$ 1300,- / delegate and including; lunch, training kit, 2 x Coffee break/day, 3 days tutorials, 1 day examination, Course certificate (approved by IOSH), excluding accommodation and Tax.

Next Schedule: 10-16 December 2012 in Bali

For further information please contact:
Tel: (62) 570 8775
Fax: (62) 570 2113

Incoming search terms:

• bandung februari event 2012
• IOSH feb 2012 courses
• safety and training february 16 2012

The way of an effective maintenance strategy

GENERAL OBJECTIVE

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To provide the participants the comprehensive course on preventive and predictive maintenance and how to implement the effective maintenance: (1) key element of maintenance and maintainability, (2) reliability factor in maintenance, (3) planning and scheduling, (4) maintenance budgeting, (4) managing preventive maintenance, (5) optimum predictive maintenance, (6) implementation predictive maintenance, (7) case study.

Recommended Participants

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• Maintenance managers
• Operation managers
• Production managers
• Maintenance Engineers and supervisors
• Service Engineers and supervisors
• Work-over engineers and supervisors
• Logistic managers & staffs

Course Outline

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1. Maintainability and Maintenance Maintainability concept, maintainability in product life cycle, life cycle cost, cost effectiveness, total life cycle cost visibility, maintainability and related interfaces, maintenance definition, maintenance category, optimum maintenance, maintenance time relationship.

2. Reliability Factors

Reliability function, failure rate and mean time betweenmaintenance (MTBF), main time to failure (MTTF), main time to first failure (MTFF), probability of survival, probability growth curve.

3. Planning and Scheduling

Maintenance planning, types of work to be planned, how to plan maintenance work, job estimating and scheduling techniques, gross versus net capacity, work order planning in detail, plan follow up.

4. Maintenance Information Flow

Purposes of maintenance information flow, maintenance work order, design of work order, work order types, three main parts of work order.

5. Managing Preventive Maintenance

Preventive maintenance, PM strategy for 3 equipment life cycles, justifying PM expenditures, PM System installation, access to equipment, PM frequency, common task, staffing the PM effort, strategies to get PM done, steps to install PM system, survey, PM

system improve professionalism.

6. Introduction to Predictive Maintenance

Introduction, advantages of predictive maintenance, failure in machinaries/equipment, somes techniques in predictive maintenance.

7. Optimum Predictive Maintenance Program

Selection of predictive maintenance system, microprocessor-based system, microprocessor, host computer, transducer.

8. Predictive Maintenance Program Implementation

Predictive maintenance program application, a successful program, the long term objectives and goals of a predictive maintenance program, management support, dedicated and accountable personnel, efficient data acquisition and analysis, equipment classification.

9. Parameter Monitoring

Vibration theory overview, mechanical equipment, machine-train component, unbalance, misalignment, mode shape and resonance, bearing and bearing type, gear and gearboxes, running speed (s).

10. Vibration Measurement

Measurement, general scheme of vibration measurement, transducer, conditioning amplifier, dynamic signal analyzer, transducer selection.

DATES & VENUE

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• DATES : 6–9 March 2012
• TIME : 8.00 am – 4.00 pm
• · VENUE : SHERATON-Hotel Bandung
• Jalan Ir. H. Juanda No. 390
• Bandung 40135 Indonesia
• Phone: +(62)(22) 2500303
• Hotel Location (Click)

Course Organizer

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Handal Consulting & Training

Jl. Danau Semayang Blok B3 No. 104

Pejompongan, Jakarta 10210

Website:http://www. handaltraining.com

Phone: +62 21 – 5708775

Fax : + 62 21 – 5702113

24 Hours INFO: +62 21-70897550

COURSE FEES

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Course Fee: Rp. 7.250.000,- including: training modules, merchandise, seminar kit, training certificate, 2 x coffee break & lunch, excluding accommodation and tax

Course Instructor

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• Dr. Ir. I Wayan Suweca & Team

Graduated from Department of Mechanical Engineering Institut Teknologi Bandung in 1985. He received his Master degree, in 1987 from Ecole Centrale de Lyon, French. He then continued to pursue a Ph.D. degree and he was awarded in 1990. From 1987 he is a faculty member of the Mechanical Engineering Department of ITB. As a lecturer, he gives courses on Technical Drawing, Design of Machine Component, Finite Element Method, Computer Aided Design, Innovative Product Development, and Design Optimization. His research interests are in mechanical design, in design optimization, in maintenance, and in control vibration. He has published and or presented many papers in national and international seminars/proceeding in the field of mechanical design, design optimization, control vibration, finite element, stress analysis, and computer aided design. His experience in mining equipment and machinery are including as a engineering consultant of PT Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam, PT Timah Tbk, PT KA Indonesia, PT INCO, PT Geodipa, PT INKA, PT DAK Bangka, PT PAMA Persada, PT Pertamina, etc. He has been involved as an instructor in a number of industrial training, both publicly and in-house (mainly for oil and gas) company in field of Maintenance, Piping Technology, Valves Technology, Hydraulics and Pneumatics, Gear Technology, Stress Analysis, Failure Analysis, Finite Element Method (Theory and Software Application), etc.

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ROTATING EQUIPMENT;

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Pemex said it regretted the deaths of the three workers, who were killed when a cable snapped. The state-owned energy company said four other workers on the offshore platform suffered serious injuries in the accident. The injured workers were taken to a hospital in Ciudad del Carmen for treatment. Pemex said it was assisting authorities with the investigation into the cause of the accident.

Oilfield Tragedy

This came in email back in 2007 with the Pemex Sonora accident photos

“At the Pemex Monthly Safety Review with Sub-Contractors we spent a considerable amount of  time listening to the causes & the current status of the investigation into the accident on the

Sonora -  Drill Line Failure.

Here is a brief summary of the notes I took:

The rig  had completed drilling the well & they were RIH with a 7  5/8″ production, tie-back string at  4772mts/15,656ft. The  tie-back string/elevators were 1.5mts/4.9ft above the rotary table. String weight was 264K. At 18.50hrs, a loud noise  was  heard. The traveling assembly fell a short distance & got caught/trapped in the stands of pipe that were  racked back in the  derrick.

The drill line parted in four (4) different  locations & dropped to the rig floor. The falling drill line was the
primary cause of the  deaths & injuries. The rig floor was littered with +/- 4″ long sections  of drill line. (H2S embrittlement? Or  harmonics? Or incorrect materials used in the manufacturing  process?)

The accident happened during meal time, & only eight (8) persons were on the rig floor at the time of the accident. Normally,  during this phase of the well, there would have been as many as fifteen (15) persons around the  rig floor i.e.   (Driller, AD,  Derrickman, 3 floormen, three casing  running crew, one pipe thread inspector, two or
three completion techs, Co Rep or completion  engineer etc)

The drill line was slipped & cut on the 14th April &  slipped on the 23rd April. Items pending verification are – Crown &  traveling assembly sheaves are to be  examined for wear & undergo a non destructive test The drill line will be  pull tested & subject to a  material analysis The drill line was manufactured in Mexico, by a  Mexican company called Camesa  (this name could be misspelt) The sheave guard inspection is ongoing The review of the records of the planned periodic inspections is ongoing.”

As you can see it was a terrible accident and tragedy. I have heard some say it was caused by backlashing the drum and then pulling the drilling line across the crown after the drill line had come off the shieves. As late as 2011 I have searched for official accident reports on this incident without success. I would think the cause of this oilfield accident would be well published so that all of us could learn from it. if you have more information please share it here

Incoming search terms:

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Purpose of this document

1. Work activities give rise to many hazards which present risks to workers and the public.The HSC/E are responsible for regulating such risks. The aim of this document is to explain the basis for HSE’s decisions regarding the degree and form of regulatory control of risk from occupational hazards, and in particular to:
2. The central purpose throughout has, therefore, been on opening up our decision-making process rather than providing guidance to duty holders. The document is thus aimed at showing how our approach to the assessment and management of risk shapes the form and content of our regulations and guidance, and informs our compliance activities. The difference in emphasis is important. For example, as we point out in paragraphs 80-81 the boundaries that HSE applies in assessing and regulating risks are generally much broader than those we would expect duty holders to undertake in complying with the relevant statutory provisions.

• • open to scrutiny our approach (eg when advising the HSC) to the assessment, management and regulation of risk and the philosophy underpinning it;
  • make transparent the factors that inform our decisions on risks and show how these shape the form and content of our regulations and guidance. For example, how account is taken of the scientific knowledge of the risks concerned, the technology available for controlling them, public attitudes towards the risks, the benefits engendered by allowing the processes, events etc giving rise to the risk to take place;
  • help reassure the public that risks to people from work activities are properly addressed, taking due account of the benefits of the activities giving rise to the risks. In particular to satisfy the public that industry, in taking advantage of technological advances and in responding to economic pressures, will not be allowed to impose intolerable risks on people;
  • let other regulators, whose responsibilities may overlap with those of HSC/E, know the basis for the management of health and safety risks arising from work activities and thereby help to promote consistency of decision-making amongst regulators.

Incoming search terms:

• nebosh - confusion between hazards and risks
• the chance that someone or something that is valued will be adversely affected in a stipulated way by a hazard

Introduction

This document is aimed primarily at stakeholders who want to know more about HSE’s philosophy for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work and for protecting others against risks to health and safety arising from work activities, and the procedures, protocols and criteria underpinning the philosophy. It sets out the basis and criteria by which HSE, in complying with its functions, decides upon the degree and form of regulatory control that it believes should be put in place for addressing occupational hazards. It considers the way scientific evidence (or the lack of it) and uncertainties are taken into account and how the balance is struck between the benefits of adopting a measure to avoid or control the risks, and its disadvantages. It is in three parts and has four appendices, as follows:

This document is aimed primarily at stakeholders who want to know more about HSE’sphilosophy for securing the health, safety and welfare of persons at work and forprotecting others against risks to health and safety arising from work activities, and theprocedures, protocols and criteria underpinning the philosophy. It sets out the basis andcriteria by which HSE, in complying with its functions, decides upon the degree and formof regulatory control that it believes should be put in place for addressing occupationalhazards. It considers the way scientific evidence (or the lack of it) and uncertainties aretaken into account and how the balance is struck between the benefits of adopting ameasure to avoid or control the risks, and its disadvantages.It is in three parts and has four appendices, as follows:

Part 1

- Sets out the aims of the document, namely the need to:

✦ open to scrutiny HSE’s approach to the regulation and management of risk, and the philosophy underpinning it;

✦ make transparent the factors that inform our decisions on how risks should be regulated and managed, for example how account is taken of the scientific knowledge of the risks concerned, the technology available for controlling them, the resource implications of adopting the decisions, public attitudes towards the risks and the benefits they engender and show how these shape the form and content that our regulations and guidance take;

✦ help reassure the public that risks to people from work activities are properly addressed, taking due account of the benefits of the activities giving rise to the risk. In particular to satisfy the public that industry, in taking advantage of technological advances and in responding to economic pressures, will not be allowed to impose intolerable risks on people;

✦ let other regulators, whose responsibilities may overlap with those of HSC/E, know the basis for the management of health and safety risks from work activities and thereby help to promote consistency of decision-making amongst regulators. In this instance, consistency does not mean uniformity, it means the particular application of a coherent philosophy in a way suitable to the particular context.

- Mentions some of the difficulties inherent in meeting the above aims, particularly those involved in taking account of ethical, social, economic and scientific considerations and the preference values of society at large

- Introduces the concept of tolerability which is central to the document. This concept (explained in greater detail in Part 3) refers to a willingness to live with a risk so as to secure certain benefits.

- Points out that the proper regulation of risks requires that both the individual risks and societal concerns engendered by a hazard must be addressed.

Part 2

Reviews some of the developments that have influenced our approach to decisionmaking since the HSW Act was enacted. The developments examined include advances in knowledge on how people view risks; changes in the regulatory environment and on the industrial scene; and shifts in the values, preferences and expectations of our society.

- Describes the principles of good regulation that have evolved in adapting our approach to take account of the developments; namely:

✦ the targeting of action: focusing on the most serious risks or where the hazards are less well controlled;

✦ consistency: adopting a similar approach in similar circumstances to achieve similar ends;

✦ proportionality: requiring action that is commensurate to the risks;

✦ transparency: being open on how decisions are arrived at and what are their implications; and

✦ accountability: making clear, for all to see, who is accountable when things go wrong.

- Notes some of the above developments which have been particularly important, ie:

✦ the need for the meaning of risk to encompass more than physical harm by taking into account other factors such as ethical, economic and social considerations;

✦ the recognition that, because the system for informing and reaching decisions is iterative, it is often very difficult to put a demarcation line between risk assessment and risk management;

✦ a discussion by the Courts of the meaning of ‘risk’ in the HSW Act which implies that approaches for managing risks must ensure that anything in an undertaking presenting the possibility of danger (or what conceptually is regarded as a hazard) has to be properly addressed.

Part 3

Describes the six stage iterative system adopted by HSE for reaching decisions on how risks should be regulated and managed, namely:

✦ deciding whether the issue is primarily one for HSC/E;

✦ defining and characterising the issue;

✦ examining the options available for addressing the issue, and their merits;

✦ adopting a particular course of action for addressing the issue efficiently and in good time, informed by the knowledge gained going through the six stage iterative system and by the expectation that as far as possible the course of action will be supported by stakeholders;

✦ implementing the decisions;

✦ evaluating the effectiveness of actions taken and revising the decisions and their implementation if necessary.

- Sets out the framework, known as the Tolerability of Risk (TOR),2 for reaching decisions on whether risks from an activity or process are unacceptable, tolerable or broadly acceptable and its application in practice. In this context, ‘tolerable’ does not mean ‘acceptable’. It refers instead to a willingness by society as a whole to live with a risk so as to secure certain benefits in the confidence that the risk is one that is worth taking and that it is being properly controlled. However, it does not imply that the risk will be acceptable to everyone, ie that everyone would agree without reservation to take the risk or have it imposed on them.

The framework makes clear that:

✦ both the level of individual risks and the societal concerns engendered by the activity or process must be taken into account when deciding whether a risk is unacceptable, tolerable or broadly acceptable;

✦ the decision-making process and criteria adopted are such that action taken is inherently precautionary;

✦ moreover, HSE starts from the position that, for every hazard, the law requires that:

– a suitable and sufficient risk assessment must be undertaken to determine the measures needed to ensure that risks from the hazard are adequately controlled;

– suitable controls must be in place to address all significant hazards, and

✦ HSE also starts with the expectation that:

– those controls, at a minimum, must achieve the standards of relevant good practice precautions, irrespective of specific risk estimates;

– where there is no relevant good practice, or the existing good practice is considered by HSE to be insufficient or inadequate, the decision as to what control measures are suitable will generally be informed by further risk assessment;

– there are some risks from certain activities, processes or practice which are not tolerable whatever the benefits, i.e. they are unacceptable. Any activity, process or practice giving rise to risks falling in that region would be ruled out unless the activity, process etc can be modified to reduce the degree of risk so that it becomes tolerable;

– as control measures are introduced, the residual risks may fall so low that additional measures to reduce them further are likely to be grossly disproportionate to the risk reduction achieved, though the control measures should still be monitored in case the risks change over time;

✦ HSE has proposed numerical criteria for informing decisions on the tolerability of risks only for very limited categories of risk, for example, those entailing fatalities either individually or in multiple fatality accidents.

Incoming search terms:

• reducing risk protecting people

Reliability Centered Maintenance, often known as RCM, is a process to ensure that assets continue to do what their users require in their present operating context.

It is generally used to achieve improvements in fields such as the establishment of safe minimum levels of maintenance, changes to operating procedures and strategies and the establishment of capital maintenance regimes and plans. Successful implementation of RCM will lead to increase in cost effectiveness, machine uptime, and a greater understanding of the level of risk that the organization is presently managing.The late John Moubray, in his industry leading book RCM2 [2], characterized Reliability-centered Maintenance as a process to establish the safe minimum levels of maintenance. This description echoed statements in the Nowlan and Heap report from United Airlines.It is defined by the technical standard SAE JA1011 [3], Evaluation Criteria for RCM Processes, which sets out the minimum criteria that any process should meet before it can be called RCM. This starts with the 7 questions below, worked through in the order that they are listed:1.What is the item supposed to do and its associated performance standards?2.In what ways can it fail to provide the required functions?3.What are the events that cause each failure?4.What happens when each failure occurs?5.In what way does each failure matter?6.What systematic task can be performed proactively to prevent, or to diminish to a satisfactory degree, the consequences of the failure?7.What must be done if a suitable preventive task cannot be found?
Reliability centered maintenance is an engineering framework that enables the definition of a complete maintenance regime. It regards maintenance as the means to maintain the functions a user may require of machinery in a defined operating context. As a discipline it enables machinery stakeholders to monitor, assess, predict and generally understand the working of their physical assets. This is embodied in the initial part of the RCM process which is to identify the operating context of the machinery, and write a Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA). The second part of the analysis is to apply the “RCM logic”, which helps determine the appropriate maintenance tasks for the identified failure modes in the FMECA. Once the logic is complete for all elements in the FMECA, the resulting list of maintenance is “packaged”, so that the periodicities of the tasks are rationalised to be called up in work packages; it is important not to destroy the applicability of maintenance in this phase. Lastly, RCM is kept live throughout the “in-service” life of machinery, where the effectiveness of the maintenance is kept under constant review and adjusted in light of the experience gained.

Reliability Centered Maintenance can be used to create a cost-effective maintenance strategy to address dominant causes of equipment failure. It is a systematic approach to defining a routine maintenance program composed of cost-effective tasks that preserve important functions.The important functions (of a piece of equipment) to preserve with routine maintenance are identified, their dominant failure modes and causes determined and the consequences of failure ascertained. Levels of criticality are assigned to the consequences of failure. Some functions are not critical and are left to “run to failure” while other functions must be preserved at all cost. Maintenance tasks are selected that address the dominant failure causes. This process directly addresses maintenance preventable failures. Failures caused by unlikely events, non-predictable acts of nature, etc. will usually receive no action provided their risk (combination of severity and frequency) is trivial (or at least tolerable). When the risk of such failures is very high, RCM encourages (and sometimes mandates) the user to consider changing something which will reduce the risk to a tolerable level.The result is a maintenance program that focuses scarce economic resources on those items that would cause the most disruption if they were to fail.
RCM emphasizes the use of Predictive maintenance (PdM) techniques in addition to traditional preventive measures.

Historical background

The term Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) was first used in public papers[citation needed] authored by Tom Matteson, Stanley Nowlan, Howard Heap, and other senior executives and engineers at United Airlines (UAL) to describe a process used to determine the optimum maintenance requirements for aircraft. Having left United Airlines to pursue a consulting career a few months before the publication of the final Nowlan-Heap report, Matteson received no authorial credit for the work. However, his contributions were substantial and perhaps indispensable to the document as a whole. The US Department of Defense (DOD) sponsored the authoring of both a textbook (by UAL) and an evaluation report (by Rand Corporation) on Reliability-Centered Maintenance, both published in 1978. They brought RCM concepts to the attention of a wider audience. The text book described efforts by commercial airlines and the US Navy in the 1960s and 70s to improve the reliability of their new jet the Boeing 747[which?].The first generation of jet aircraft had a crash rate that would be considered highly alarming today, and both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the airlines’ senior management felt strong pressure to improve matters. In the early 1960s, with FAA approval the airlines began to conduct a series of intensive engineering studies on in-service aircraft. The studies proved that the fundamental assumption of design engineers and maintenance planners—that every airplane and every major component in the airplane (such as its engines) had a specific “lifetime” of reliable service, after which it had to be replaced (or overhauled) in order to prevent failures—was wrong in nearly every specific example in a complex modern jet airliner.This was one of many astounding discoveries that have revolutionized the managerial discipline of physical asset management and have been at the base of many developments since this seminal work was published. Among some of the paradigm shifts inspired by RCM were:an understanding that the vast majority of failures are not necessarily linked to the age of the asset (this is often modeled by the “memoryless” exponential probability distribution)changing from efforts to predict life expectancies to trying to manage the process of failurean understanding of the difference between the requirements of assets from a user perspective, and the design reliability of the assetan understanding of the importance of managing assets on condition (often referred to as condition monitoring, condition based maintenance and predictive maintenance)an understanding of four basic routine maintenance taskslinking levels of tolerable risk to maintenance strategy developmentToday RCM is defined in the standard SAE JA1011, Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) Processes. This sets out the minimum criteria for what is, and for what is not, able to be defined as RCM.The standard is a watershed event in the ongoing evolution of the discipline of physical asset management. Prior to the development of the standard many processes were labeled as RCM even though they were not true to the intentions and the principles in the original report that defined the term publicly.Today companies can use this standard to ensure that the processes, services and software they purchase and implement conforms with what is defined as RCM, ensuring the best possibility of achieving the many benefits attributable to rigorous application of RCM.Basic Features

The RCM process described in the DOD/UAL report recognized three principal risks from equipment failures: threatsto safety,to operations, andto the maintenance budget.
Modern RCM gives threats to the environment a separate classification, though most forms manage them in the same way as threats to safety.RCM offers four principal options among the risk management strategies:on-condition maintenance tasks,scheduled restoration or discard maintenance tasks,failure-finding maintenance tasks, andone-time changes to the “system” (changes to hardware design, to operations, or to other things).RCM also offers specific criteria to use when selecting a risk management strategy for a system that presents a specific risk when it fails. Some are technical in nature (can the proposed task detect the condition it needs to detect? does the equipment actually wear out, with use?). Others are goal-oriented (is it reasonably likely that the proposed task-and-task-frequency will reduce the risk to a tolerable level?). The criteria are often presented in the form of a decision-logic diagram, though this is not intrinsic to the nature of the process.Identification of Safety Critical Elements (SCE) and maintaining associated pre defined performance standards is the foundation of asset integrity management.In use
After being created by the commercial aviation industry, RCM was adopted by the U.S. military (beginning in the mid-1970s) and by the U.S. commercial nuclear power industry (in the 1980s). It began to enter other commercial industries and fields in the early 1990s.Starting in the late 1980s, a series of independent initiatives sprang up that were intended to reduce the process’s complexity without reducing its benefits. A partial list of these initiatives would include:”RCM 2″, Aladon”dRCM” ERC”RCM Blitz” RCM Blitz”Streamlined” RCM,”PM Optimization,” or PMO PM Optimisation,

Naval Sea Systems Command “Classic RCM” and “Backfit RCM”. Outlined in references below. Backfit RCM is used as a continuous process improvement process tool to evaluate existing maintenance tasks.

Since each initiative is sponsored by one or more consulting firms eager to help clients use it, there is still considerable disagreement about their relative merits (and dangers). Also there is a tendency for consulting firms to promote a software package as an alternative methodology.
However, the RCM standard (SAE JA1011, available from http://www.sae.org) provides the minimum criteria that processes must comply with if they are to be called RCM. Although a voluntary standard, it provides a reference for companies looking to implement RCM to ensure they are getting a process, software package or service that is in line with the original report.Nonetheless, everyone well-acquainted with RCM seems to agree that a thorough application of the RCM analytic process is still the most flexible and comprehensive tool available for identifying the actions that need to be taken to ensure that the risks of equipment failure are reduced to a tolerable level.[citation needed]

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Foreword

This program is provided for people from all around the world who work in Oil and Gas and the connected industries. Oil and Gas is a hazardous industry. Managers, supervisors, offshore and onshore workers need specialist skills and know-how to fulfil their health and safety responsibilities. It is also desgined to provided an intellegence skill and underpinning knowledge that enables them to manage operational oil and gas risks efficience and effectively.

This certification program concerns on international standards and management systems, delivers essential tools to the oil and gas industry by creating occupational, health and safety competent workforce which in turns strengthens HSE management. After just one week of training you will be able to implement strategies to effectively manage risks that exist in the Oil and Gas industry.

What will I gain from this qualification?

• Give you vital understanding to help you perform better in your role
• Understand the techniques that are useful and practical in your industry, not just theoretical
• The NEBOSH name is a mark of excellence in the field of health and safety throughout the world
• Holding a NEBOSH qualification can help you stand out and bring you success and advancement

What will my company gain from this qualification?

• Keeping people safe from injury and loss of life, it also means protecting valuable assets and avoiding prosecution, litigation and loss of reputation of company
• Help company achieve international standards and can even help win new business
• Provide a practical knowledge that brings real value, wherever they operate
• The qualification focuses on hydrocarbon process safety, so that candidates can effectively discharge workplace health and safety responsibilities both onshore and offshore throughout the world.

NEBOSH COURSE OUTLINE

The syllabus consists of one unit. The unit is divided into a number of elements:

ELEMENT 1: Health, Safety and environmental management in context

• Learning from Incidents
• Hazards inherent in oil and gas
• Risk Management Techniques used in the oil and gas industries
• Safety cases and safety reports

ELEMENT 2: Hydrocarbon process safety 1

• Contractor management
• Process Safety Management (PSM)
• Role and Purpose of a permit-to-work system
• Key principles of shift handover
• Plant operations and maintenance

ELEMENT 3: Hydrocarbon process safety 2

• Failure modes
• Safety critical equipment controls
• Safe storage of hydrocarbons
• Furnace and boiler operations

ELEMENT 4: Fire protection and emergency responset

• Fire and explosion risk in the oil and gas industries
• Emergency Response

ELEMENT 5: Logistics and Transport operations

• Marine Transport
• Land Transport

Course Fees

Course fee is US $ 2100,- /delegate and could be transferred to the Handal Wira Mandiri account number, and including; lunch, training kit, 2 x Coffee break/day, study book, NEBOSH exam & regristration fees, excluding accommodation, Tax and Bank administration fees.

DATES & VENUE

- Dates: 16 – 20 April 2012

- Venue : Bandung – Indonesia

Accomodation can be organized by Handal Consulting & Training

For further information please contact:
Tel: (62) 570 8775
Fax: (62) 570 2113

Not to be missed, so make sure you’re part of it

The certification program schedule for NEBOSH ITC in Oil & Gas  Operational Safety on Year 2012;

1. 20-24 February 2012, Bandung (Running Well)

2. 16-20 April 2012, Bali

3. 25-29 June 2012, Bali

4. 17-21 September 2012, Bandung

5. 3- 7 December 2012, Bali

We would like to say thank you and great appreciate to the all delegates that have been attended the NEBOSH ITC in Oil  & Gas Operational Safety on 28 Nov’ – 2 Dec’ 2011 in Bali

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